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RACIAL PROFILING IN GREATER MINNESOTA AND THE CASE FOR
EXPANDING THE DRIVER’S LICENSE PRIVILEGE TO ALL
MINNESOTA RESIDENTS

By Benjamin Feist, Teresa Nelson and Ian Bratlie1

1
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Law. Teresa Nelson is the Legal Director for the ACLU of Minnesota. Ian Bratlie is a Staff
Attorney with the Greater Minnesota Racial Justice Project of the ACLU of Minnesota in
Mankato. The authors wish to thank legal interns Gordon Knoblach, Morgan Miller, Chrisiant
Bracken, and Caitlin Miles for their research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Racial profiling is a pervasive issue for immigrants in the United States, and it is

becoming increasingly problematic for Latinos2 living and working in the predominantly rural
communities of Greater Minnesota. Reports from throughout the state indicate that Latinos are
disproportionately targeted by the police on a regular basis.
In the waning days of the 2013 session of the Minnesota Legislature, advocates filled the
Capitol rotunda to demand action on a myriad of unresolved social and economic issues. Often
ignored by passing legislators, lobbyists and staff, a handful of Latino immigrants sat quietly on
folding chairs in front of the entrance to the chamber of the House of Representatives. They held
hand-made signs to explain that they were on a hunger strike to prompt action on a bill that
would allow Minnesota residents to obtain a driving-only license regardless of immigration
status.3 In spite of the days-long hunger strike, the House failed to act on the bill before the end
of session.4
This issue remains a priority for immigrants’ rights advocates and we will likely see
similar efforts in future sessions of the Minnesota Legislature. Advocates have raised numerous
arguments in support of expanding the driver’s license privilege. Their arguments focus

2

For purposes of this article, we will use terms “Hispanic” and “Latino” interchangeably.
See John Croman, Immigrants stage hunger strike over driver’s licenses, USA TODAY (May 14,
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/14/immigrant-hungerstrike/2159419/.
4
Allison Herrera, Hungering for a driver’s license: Effort by undocumented immigrants comes
close, but not this year, TWIN CITIES DAILY PLANET (May 21, 2013),
http://www.tcdailyplanet.net/news/2013/05/21/hungering-drivers-license-effort-undocumentedimmigrants-comes-close-not-year.
3
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primarily on the benefits to public safety.5 Often overlooked in this discussion is the effect that
expanding the privilege could have on decreasing instances of the racial profiling of Latino
residents.
This article begins with a discussion of the work of the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”), and its Minnesota affiliate, relating to immigrants’ rights. Next, this article provides
an overview of current federal and state laws dealing with racial profiling. This discussion of
current laws will focus on law enforcement stops of Latino drivers. Third, this article analyzes
the debate over providing driver’s licenses to state residents regardless of immigration status.
Finally, this article concludes that, given the current state of racial profiling law, allowing a
driver’s license privilege to all Minnesota residents is sound public policy that has the potential
to decrease instances of racial profiling.
II.

THE GREATER MINNESOTA RACIAL JUSTICE PROJECT
The ACLU concerns itself with the constitutional rights and liberties of all people in the

United States, not just U.S. citizens.6 The fundamental constitutional protections of due process
and equal protection embodied in the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights apply to
every "person" and are not limited to citizens.7

5

See, e.g., Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., Fact Sheet: Why Denying Driver’s Licenses to
Undocumented Immigrants Harms Public Safety and Makes Our Communities Less Secure,
NILC.ORG (Jan. 12, 2008), http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=878.
6
ACLU, Immigrants’ Rights: No Human Being is Illegal, ACLU.ORG,
https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights [hereinafter “No Human Being is Illegal”].
7
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); see generally No
Human Being is Illegal, supra note 6.

VOLUME 5

A.

2013-2014
Page 85
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS ADVOCACY

The national ACLU organization formed due to concerns of civil libertarians regarding
the treatment of immigrants in the 1920s.8 In late 1919 and early 1920, the government
summarily detained and deported many immigrants because of their political views.9 In what
became known as the “Palmer Raids,” Attorney General Mitchell Palmer targeted, arrested, and
deported so-called “radical” immigrants without regard to constitutional protections or individual
civil liberties.10 Since then, the ACLU has defended non-citizens trying to exercise their rights
and has fought anti-immigrant laws throughout the country.11 For example, the ACLU was
instrumental in the recent racial profiling case against Sheriff Joe Arpaio in Maricopa County,
Arizona, for his aggressive persecution of racial minorities in his community.12
The ACLU of Minnesota13 was founded in 1952, and its Greater Minnesota Racial Justice
Project (“GMRJP”) opened an office in Mankato, Minnesota in 2011.14 The goal of the GMRJP

8

ACLU, ACLU History, https://www.aclu.org/aclu-history [hereinafter “ACLU History”].
ACLU, About the ACLU’s Immigrants’ Rights Project, https://www.aclu.org/immigrantsrights/about-aclus-immigrants-rights-project [hereinafter “About the Immigrants’ Rights
Project”].
10
See ACLU History, supra note 8.
11
See About the Immigrants’ Rights Project, supra note 9. For example, the ACLU has litigated
cases in the United States Supreme Court, including Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), and
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), which upheld immigrants’ right to habeas corpus and
reversed deportation of longtime legal residents.
12
Melendres v. Arpaio, No. PHX–CV–07–02513–GMS, 2013 WL 2297173 (D. Ariz. May 24,
2013); see also Press Release, ACLU, Federal Court Rules Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio Violated
U.S. Constitution (May 24, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/print/immigrants-rights-racialjustice/federal-court-rules-arizona-sheriff-joe-arpaio-violated-us.
13
The ACLU of Minnesota is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting the
civil liberties of all Minnesotans under the United States and Minnesota constitutions. It
promotes its mission through litigation, public education and lobbying efforts.
14
See ACLU of Minnesota, Why We Chose Mankato: A Message from the ACLU-MN’s
Executive Director, Chuck Samuelson, http://www.aclu9

VOLUME 5

2013-2014
Page 86

is to address the problems of unequal and biased treatment of communities of color in all levels
of the criminal justice system in Greater Minnesota.15
B.

CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS IN SOUTHERN MINNESOTA

Southern Minnesota is home to many small and isolated communities dealing with a
rapid influx of immigrants. United States Census Bureau data, which is often low when counting
undocumented populations, shows a significant increase in the number of Latinos living in the
region over the last ten-year period.16 This rise in the number of Latino residents can be
attributed to economic considerations and jobs marketed toward migrant workers, including
several food processing plants in Southern Minnesota.17 An Equal Opportunity Commission
report from 1998 notes that 33% of workers in the meat and poultry products industries in South
Central Minnesota are Latino.18 As the chart below demonstrates, several counties in Southern
Minnesota have seen dramatic changes in their demographics between 2000 and 2010, showing
continued growth of the Latino population.

mn.org/issues/racialjustice/gmrjpsouth/whywechosemankato/ [hereinafter “Why We Chose
Mankato”].
15
Id.
16
Mankato, Minnesota Population: Census 2010 and 2000 Interactive Map, Demographics,
Statistics, Quick Facts, CENSUSVIEWER, http://censusviewer.com/city/MN/Mankato.
17
See generally James J. Kielkopf, Estimating the Economic Impact of the Latino Workforce in
South Central Minnesota, CTR. FOR RURAL POL’Y AND DEV. (Sept. 2000),
http://www.ruralmn.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/latinoworkforce.pdf.
18
James J. Kielkopf, The Economic Impact of Undocumented Workers in Minnesota, HISPANIC
ADVOCACY AND COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT THROUGH RESEARCH (HACER), 9 (Sept. 2000),
http://www.uwlax.edu/faculty/giddings/ECO108/hacer.pdf.
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2000
Hispanic
population

County
Blue Earth
Brown
Faribault
Freeborn
Le Sueur
Martin
McLeod
Mower
Nicollet
Nobles
Rice
Sibley
Steele
Waseca
Watonwan
Total pop.

988
545
566
2,049
997
421
1,268
1,646
535
2,325
3,117
834
1,266
566
1,804
18,927

2000 Hispanic
population (%)
1.8
2.0
3.5
6.3
3.9
1.9
3.6
4.2
1.8
11.1
5.5
5.4
3.7
2.9
15.2

2010 Hispanic
population
(%)
1,600
854
815
2,750
1,441
750
1,811
4,138
1,211
4,820
5,122
1,096
2,282
976
2,343
32,009

2010 Hispanic
population (%)
2.5
3.3
5.6
8.8
5.2
3.6
4.9
10.6
3.7
22.5
8.0
7.2
6.2
5.1
20.9

Annual
growth
(%)

Ten year
growth
(%)

6.1
5.6
4.4
3.4
4.4
7.8
4.2
15.1
12.7
10.7
6.4
3.1
8.0
7.2
3.0
6.9

62
57
44
34
45
78
43
151
126
107
64
31
80
72
30
69

*This chart was compiled by the authors using data from the United States Census Bureau.
See Mankato, Minnesota Population, supra footnote 15.*

Since 2011, the GMRJP has conducted community outreach to identify and assist with
civil liberties issues faced by Latino communities in Southern Minnesota.19 The Project found
that these communities often face hardships based on the language barrier, cultural differences,
and a lack of understanding of their rights and the U.S. criminal justice system.20 Based on
extensive outreach activities and interviews, the GMRJP found that Latino residents routinely
face issues of racial profiling, fear of law enforcement and disengagement from the
community.21
19

See Why We Chose Mankato, supra note 14.
See generally Greater Minnesota Racial Justice Project Newsletter, Vol. 1, Issue 1, (ACLU),
Winter 2013, http://www.aclumn.org/files/7013/8687/1945/ACLU_south_newletter_Winter_2013.pdf.
21
See, e.g., Dan Linehan, Gaylord defends officer against claims of profiling, THE FREE PRESS,
MANKATO, MN (April 6, 2013), http://www.mankatofreepress.com/local/x1319127296/Gaylorddefends-officer-against-claims-of-profiling.
20
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DATA ON ARREST RATES AND PENDING LITIGATION

Prior to opening the GMRJP office in Mankato, the ACLU of Minnesota filed Data
Practices Requests in order to obtain data on arrests and juvenile apprehensions by race and
ethnicity.22 This data, coupled with stories of racial profiling of immigrants related to the ACLU
of Minnesota by members of the community, raised concerns of over-policing of minorities
throughout Southern Minnesota, particularly in the Mankato area.23 As outlined in the following
chart compiled from data reported by the individual counties to the Minnesota Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension from 2008 to 2010, the percentage of Latinos arrested in these counties
appears disproportionally high.24

County

Hispanic county population (%)

Hispanic adult arrests (%)

Blue Earth
Faribault
Le Sueur
Martin
Nicollet
Nobles
Steele
Waseca
Watonwan

2.5
5.6
5.2
3.6
3.7
22.5
6.2
5.1
20.9

6.2
6.9
10.4
9.8
14.8
27.5
13.8
9.6
20.3

*Chart data obtained by the ACLU in Data Practices requests. For more information, contact the authors.*

In 2011 and 2012, the Mankato office of the American Civil Liberties Union of
Minnesota (ACLU-MN) received complaints of racial profiling and harassment of Latino
residents in the small town of Gaylord, Minnesota.25 The ACLU-MN launched an investigation,

22

See Why We Chose Mankato, supra note 14; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 13.03 (West 2012).
Why We Chose Mankato, supra note 14.
24
Source data on file with the authors.
25
John Tevlin, ACLU review of one cop’s record is point of contention, STAR TRIBUNE (Jan. 15,
2013), http://www.startribune.com/local/187057871.html.
23
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focused specifically on Gaylord police officer Eric Boon, including reviewing tapes from a
dashboard camera, dispatch records, citations and reports from 261 of his stops.26 When viewed
by race, the data indicated that 54% of Boon’s stops were of minority residents and 59% of the
tickets he issued were to minorities.27 While this investigation received attention in the media,
we are concerned that these issues will not be addressed by the government actors without
formal action in the courts.
Following a separate incident, the ACLU of Minnesota filed a lawsuit against the
Gaylord Police Department on February 12, 2013.28 The Complaint, filed in Federal District
Court, alleges violations of Plaintiff Jesus Manuela Mendoza Sierra’s Fourth, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights when the defendant officers and deputies arrested, detained and
interrogated her without probable cause to suspect that she had committed any criminal
activities.29 The Complaint further alleges that the police illegally targeted Ms. Mendoza Sierra
based on her color, ethnicity and national origin.30 The ACLU of Minnesota is concerned these
actions remain common place in Southern Minnesota, where the ACLU perceives that residents

26

Id.
Id.
28
Complaint, Mendoza Sierra v. City of Gaylord, et al., No. 0:13CV00347 (D. Minn. Feb. 12,
2013), available at http://www.aclumn.org/files/3613/6140/0623/Filed_Complaint_w_judge_assignment_Gaylord.pdf. The
Complaint names the City of Gaylord, Sibley County and numerous other governmental actors as
defendants. Id.
29
Press Release, ACLU of Minnesota, ACLU-MN Files Discrimination Lawsuit Against
Gaylord Police and Others (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.aclu-mn.org/news/2013/02/19/aclu-mnfiles-discrimination-lawsuit-against-gaylord-police.
30
Complaint, supra note 28, at ¶ 1. Ms. Mendoza Sierra is a lawful permanent resident who
immigrated to Minnesota in May of 2009. Id. at ¶ 7.
27
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like Ms. Mendoza Sierra are treated differently by local law enforcement officials simply due to
their background and race.31
III.

RACIAL PROFILING LAW
The ACLU defines racial profiling as the “discriminatory practice by law enforcement

officials of targeting individuals for suspicion of crime based on the individual's race, ethnicity,
religion or national origin.”32 Although some states define racial profiling as the practice of
police relying “solely” on the basis of race or ethnicity in determining who to police, racial
profiling occurs any time police use race as a factor in deciding who to stop or investigate.
Racial profiling does not include police considering race when they are looking for a suspect and
the description of the suspect includes information about the suspect’s race or ethnicity along
with other identifying information.
In addition to violating the constitutional right to equal protection, racial profiling can
have devastating effects on communities of color. Racial profiling results in minority
communities being disproportionately targeted for law enforcement activities, making them more
likely to have an arrest or even criminal record. The collateral effects of having an arrest or
criminal record include difficulties finding stable housing and employment. Racial profiling also
sows the seeds of distrust in the community, making people less likely to turn to the police when
they are in trouble and making it more difficult to get cooperation from the public when they are
investigating crimes. For members of immigrant communities, some of whom are present in the
U.S. without authorization, the collateral effects of racial profiling are amplified by their
immigration status.
31

Id.
ACLU, Racial Profiling: Definition (Nov. 23, 2005), https://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racial-profiling-definition.
32
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LEGAL OVERVIEW

One means of addressing racial profiling is through litigation; however, litigation is not a
panacea because the bar is high to prove that racial profiling has occurred.
1.

Racially-motivated stops under the Fourth Amendment

Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer’s subjective intent to stop an individual is
immaterial if the officer had probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred.33 Probable
cause exists when an officer sees a traffic violation. When the officer sees such a violation, he or
she may stop the vehicle and conduct a reasonable investigation.34 A reasonable investigation
includes asking the driver and passengers about their destination, route, and purpose.35 If an
encounter after completion of a traffic stop is consensual, then an officer may ask questions
unrelated to the stop and request consent to search the vehicle.36 However, police may not
expand the scope of a traffic stop unless the expansion is supported by a reasonable articulable
suspicion.37
2.

Racial profiling as a violation of the right to equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment

In Whren, the Supreme Court noted that “the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement
of the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to
intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth

33

United States v. Gomez-Serena, 368 F.3d 1037, 1041 (8th Cir. 2004) (defendant who
conceded officer had probable cause to conduct traffic stop failed to show officer stopped him
solely on account of race) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
34
United States v. Sanchez, 417 F.3d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 2005).
35
Id. at 975.
36
United States v. Santos-Garcia, 313 F.3d 1073, 1078 (8th Cir. 2002).
37
State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn. 2003).
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Amendment.”38 The Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection may become relevant
prior to the initiation of a traffic stop.39 An officer’s discriminatory motivation to stop a vehicle
because of the race or ethnicity of its occupants can give rise to an Equal Protection claim.40 To
prevail on an Equal Protection claim, one must prove that the police officer subjected them “to
unequal treatment based upon their race or ethnicity during the course of an otherwise lawful
traffic stop . . . .”41
“[O]rdinary equal protection standards” govern claims alleging racially selective
enforcement of facially neutral laws.42 To prevail on an equal protection claim, one must prove
that the police officer’s decision to stop the vehicle or his conduct during the traffic stop was
both: (1) motivated by a discriminatory purpose, and (2) had a discriminatory effect on the
identifiable group to which the defendants belong.43

38

517 U.S. at 813.
United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 352 (6th Cir. 1997).
40
Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2002).
41
Id. “The Supreme Court has held that ‘purposeful discrimination that violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will also violate [18 U.S.C.] § 1981.’” Giron v.
City of Alexander, 693 F. Supp. 2d 904, 944 (E.D. Ark. 2010) (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 275–76 n.23 (2003)).
42
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470
U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
43
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (citing Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (equal
protection violation where evidence proved state had enacted a provision for the purpose of
disfranchising blacks and the law had a discriminatory effect on blacks as compared to similarly
situated whites)). See also Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 999–1000 (8th Cir. 2003) (§ 1983
claim alleging selective enforcement of traffic laws in violation of the Equal Protection Clause);
United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996) (alleged selective enforcement of bicycle
headlamp law); Farm Labor Organizing Comm., 308 F.3d at 533–36; Chavez v. Ill. State Police,
251 F.3d 612, 635–36 (7th Cir. 2001) (§ 1983 suit alleging state police used racial classifications
in deciding whom to stop, detain, and search in enforcing traffic laws); United States v. Bullock,
94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying Armstrong in denying defendant’s attempt to present
evidence of trooper’s prior traffic stops to prove officer escalated traffic stops of young black
39
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In United States v. Bell, the Eighth Circuit held that proof of discriminatory effect
requires a plaintiff to prove that “people of another race violated the law and the law was not
enforced against them.”44 For example, specific evidence of similarly situated non-minority
motorists who were not stopped for the traffic violation, or statistical or other evidence which
generally proves that members of a protected racial group receive less favorable treatment than
nonmembers may both serve to prove discriminatory effect.45 There continues to be debate on
whether it is necessary to name a similarly-situated individual.46
The second proof requirement – proof of discriminatory purpose – is much more difficult
to establish. Proof of discriminatory purpose requires one to show that the police officer’s
decision to stop the vehicle was at least partially based on race.47 Discriminatory purpose
“implies more than . . . intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision
maker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not
merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”48
It is not necessary to prove that an officer lacked any race-neutral reason for conducting
the traffic stop.49 However, the absence of a race-neutral reason for the stop, coupled with
statistics showing that the officer disproportionately stops minorities, may lead a reasonable juror
males into drug investigations); United States v. Anderson, 923 F.2d 450, 453–54 (6th Cir. 1991)
(no discriminatory purpose found where sheriff checked felony record of black defendant
following traffic stop though he did not perform background checks on all persons he arrested).
44
86 F.3d at 823.
45
Chavez, 251 F.3d at 636; Farm Labor Org. Comm., 308 F.3d at 534; United States v. Barlow,
310 F.3d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002).
46
See Albert. W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163,
201 (2002).
47
Bell, 86 F.3d at 823 (citing United States v. Brown, 9 F.3d 1374, 1376 (8th Cir. 1993)).
48
Brown, 9 F.3d at 1376 (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 610).
49
See Farm Labor Org. Comm., 308 F.3d at 538.
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to conclude that the stop was based on a discriminatory purpose.50 In addition, “[A]n invidious
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the
fact, if it is true, that the [practice] bears more heavily on one race than another.”51 If a litigant
makes a prima facie showing of both discriminatory effect and purpose, the burden shifts to the
government to show the same enforcement decision would have been made even if race had not
been considered.52
While a prima facie equal protection claim may be proved by direct evidence of racial
discrimination,53 it is more commonly based on circumstantial evidence.54 A police officer’s
discriminatory selective law enforcement may be inferred from evidence of the officer’s pattern
and method of performing traffic stops and arrests, relevant departmental policies and training
governing the officer’s conduct, failure to uniformly comply with the relevant training and
supervisory instruction received, the questions presented and statements made by the officer to
vehicle occupants, the specific events of the traffic stop at issue, and any other relevant
information which may support an inference of discriminatory purpose in this context.55
To the extent they are reliable, statistics may be used to evaluate whether the officer’s
“pattern” of traffic stops and arrests raises an inference of racial discrimination or tends to prove
50

See Berg v. United States, CIV 03-4642 MJD/JSM, 2007 WL 425448 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2007).
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
52
Bell, 86 F.3d at 823 (citing Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 819 n.2 (4th
Cir. 1995)).
53
See Crooks, 326 F.3d at 1000.
54
See Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1059 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[T]here will seldom be
‘eyewitness’ testimony as to [racially discriminatory] mental processes.”) (quoting U.S. Postal
Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
55
See Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg’l Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1168 (10th Cir. 2003); see also
United States v. Woods, 213 F.3d 1021, 1022–23 (8th Cir. 2000) (discussing Minnesota’s policy
and task force report on racial profiling).
51
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that similarly situated members of non-minority groups were treated better.56 While statistics
alone will rarely be sufficient to prove racially discriminatory conduct, personal accounts of
actual discrimination or the effects of discriminatory practices may complement this empirical
evidence and bring “cold numbers convincingly to life.”57
Challenges “to the specific acts of a particular police officer bears some resemblance to a
claim of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory jury challenges, which also involves the
acts of a single state actor (the prosecutor) in the course of a single incident (the selection of the
jury).”58 “In such cases, the Supreme Court has instructed that the court should ‘consider all
relevant circumstances,’ including the prosecutor’s ‘pattern of strikes against black jurors,’ and
the prosecutor’s ‘questions and statements,’ which may ‘support or refute an inference of
discriminatory purpose.’”59 “Similarly, a police officer’s pattern of traffic stops and arrests, his
questions and statements to the person involved, and other relevant circumstances may support
an inference of discriminatory purpose in this context.”60

56

Marshall, 345 F.3d at 1171.
Int’l Broth. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (evaluating sufficiency of
evidence in a Title VII racial discrimination action); see also Catlett v. Mo. Highway & Transp.
Com’n, 828 F.2d 1260, 1265 (8th Cir. 1987) (statistical evidence revealing gender disparity in
hiring and anecdotal evidence of discriminatory acts may establish pattern or practice of
discrimination); Coral Constr. Co. v. King Cnty, 941 F.2d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he
combination of convincing anecdotal and statistical evidence is potent.”).
58
Marshall, 345 F.3d at 1168.
59
Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–97 (1986)).
60
Id. at 1168.
57
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EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAIMS

In Giron v. City of Alexander,61 plaintiffs proved that defendant police officers
purposefully and unlawfully considered their ethnicity in exercising discretion to stop their
vehicles, violating their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 1981, and state
law.62 The plaintiffs used direct evidence and numerical evidence gathered from citations issued
by the police officer to prove their claim.63 The direct evidence included the testimony of a
friend of the police officer who had accompanied the officer on ride alongs.64 The friend’s
testimony spoke of the police officer’s use of certain traffic laws as a pretext to pull over
Latinos.65 The plaintiffs also had a fellow police officer testify against the defendant, whom the
witness viewed as his boss.66 For numerical evidence, the plaintiffs introduced the citation
statistics of a defendant police officer, which showed a heavy bias towards Latinos.67 The claims
were also buttressed with the fact of the city’s financial difficulties, providing incentive for the
defendant’s superiors to overlook defendant’s actions in lieu of increasing city revenue.68 The
court used this evidence to prove both discriminatory effect and purpose, rejecting defendant’s
claim that the plaintiffs must show a similarly-situated individual who was not investigated or
cited.69
61

693 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Ark. 2010).
Id. at 939–42.
63
Id. at 937–39.
64
Id. at 925.
65
Id. at 924–26.
66
Giron v. City of Alexander, 693 F. Supp. 2d 904, 927 (E.D. Ark. 2010).
67
Id. at 928–31.
68
Id. at 913–16.
69
Id. at 938.
62
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In United States v. Alcaraz-Arrellano,70 the court held that defendant did not carry his
burden in producing some evidence of discriminatory purpose or effect.71 The court rejected a
statistical study of police stops in the state because it did not include the jurisdiction of this
particular police department, nor did the defendant show that the data was transferable due to an
equal racial composition of the area studied and the area where the incident occurred.72 The
circuit court also upheld the district court’s finding that the statistical data was unreliable because
it did not include an appendix describing how the data was collected, because the sample size
was too small, because the survey classified individuals’ races subjectively, because the police
departments monitored were not random, and because the officers knew they were being
monitored.73 In sum, the court found the statistics insufficient to show discriminatory effect.74
The court disjointed discriminatory effect from discriminatory intent,75 noting that the defendant
must “present some non-statistical evidence to demonstrate that [the police officer] acted with
discriminatory intent when he stopped defendant.”76
In United States v. Barlow,77 the court rejected the statistical evidence offered by the
defendant as neither reliable nor relevant, noting concern with the methodology of the study.78
The court noted that even if it accepted the validity of the statistical evidence, the defendant “still
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441 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2006).
71
Id. at 1265.
72
Id. at 1262.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 1263.
75
United States v. Alcaraz-Arrellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1263 (10th Cir. 2006).
76
Id.
77
310 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2002).
78
Id. at 1011.
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presented no evidence that he received less favorable treatment than similarly situated white
travelers.”79 “To meet his burden under Armstrong, [defendant] needed to present evidence that
the DEA agents observed whites engaging in the same behavior as defendant—i.e., looking
nervously over their shoulders—but chose not to approach them.”80 The court also stated that
the defendant had no evidence of discriminatory purpose, noting that the DEA agents made “no
racial comments during their encounter with [defendant].”81
In United States v. Duque-Nava,82 the court rejected the same study as in United States v.
Alcaraz-Arrellano for the same reasons.83 However, the court concluded that because the data of
the individual deputy’s stops of Hispanic motorists was so much higher than the data in the
discredited study, there was still a strong showing of discriminatory effect.84 As for
discriminatory purpose, the court was much stricter. The court noted that the defendant offered
“scant direct evidence” to “support an inference that racial considerations played a part in his
stop.”85
There is no evidence that [the police officer] treated, spoke to, or otherwise
exhibited discriminatory behavior towards defendant, the driver or any other
persons previously stopped by [the officer] for a traffic violation . . . In fact, [the
police officer] testified that at the moment he decided to stop the pick-up truck
because of the cracked windshield, he had ‘no idea’ of the driver's or defendant's
race or ethnicity.86

79

Id. at 1012.
Id. (citing Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465).
81
Id.
82
315 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D. Kan. 2004).
83
Id. at 1156–57.
84
Id. at 1159.
85
Id. at 1161.
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Id.
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Defendant noted that the police officer “pulled next to the truck before signaling the
driver to stop, implying that [the officer] observed the driver's or defendant's appearance before
making the stop,” but the police officer testified that it is a “standard practice that allows the
officer to determine the number of occupants of the car for purposes of officer safety.”87 The
court did note that, “[a]lthough statistics alone are generally viewed as insufficient evidence of
intent, certainly a comparison of an officer's stops with similarly situated officers in his own
police department might be evidence of an officer's particular pattern of discriminatory intent or
motive.”88 For statistics to work to show intent, the court noted that “one must show causality”
which has “three components: temporal order; correlation; and lack of alternative plausible
explanations.”89
In Berg v. United States,90 the Minnesota District Court found that fact questions
remained for a jury to decide whether DEA agents, who stopped and searched an airline
passenger because her bag looked heavy, had adequate suspicion to justify the stop.91 In
addition, because the data showed that the agent’s cold stops were overwhelmingly minorities,
there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the stop of Berg was racially
motivated.92
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United States v. Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1161 (D. Kan. 2004).
88
Id. at 1163.
89
Id.
90
No. CIV 03-4642 MJD/JSM, 2007 WL 425448 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2007).
91
Id. at *6–7.
92
Id. at *8 (“Common sense suggests that the ‘no bags,’ ‘little bags,’ ‘computer bags,’ ‘heavy
bags,’ and other innocuous criteria upon which Key based her suspicions must apply equally to
people of all races who deplane from source cities. Thus, a question remains as to why Key’s
cold-stops were overwhelmingly minority persons, and particularly why Key stopped Berg.”).
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Finally, in Anderson v. Cornejo,93 a group of African-American women sued, alleging
that they were subjected to non-routine searches by U.S. Customs employees following their
arrival on international airline flights in violation of their Fifth Amendment right to Equal
Protection.94 Although numerous claims were dismissed based on qualified immunity or failure
to adequately prove both discriminatory treatment and purpose, the District Court concluded that
several of the plaintiffs were able to show that customs agents lacked adequate suspicion for the
non-routine searches, that some of the plaintiffs were treated differently than similarly-situated
white individuals,95 and that factors, including the inadequate basis for searches, false statements
by customs agents as to the reasons for the searches, and statistical disparities, were sufficient to
establish that some of the defendants acted with discriminatory intent.96
C.

RACIAL PROFILING CLAIMS IN MINNESOTA COURTS

Minnesota courts have addressed the issue of police racial profiling in several cases. In
City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, the Minnesota Supreme Court established the standard for a
claim of unfair discriminatory practices in the provision of public services under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act.97 The court held that proof of racial discrimination in the area of public
services could be established with either: (1) proof that, in the provision of public services, the
individual’s treatment was worse than similarly situated individuals of a different race, or (2)
proof that the way in which the individual was treated was so at variance with what is reasonably
93

284 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
Id. at 1017–18.
95
Id. at 1045 (“With only one exception, African-American women are subjected to intrusive
searches more than twice as often as the compared groups in each type of situation in which a
defendant is involved.”).
96
Id. at 1054–55.
97
293 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Minn. 1976).
94
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anticipated in the absence of racial discrimination that the probable explanation for the treatment
is racial discrimination.98
Two recent Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions applied the Richardson “at variance”
test in the context of racial profiling allegations against the Minneapolis Police Department. In
Williams v. Minneapolis Police Department,99 the court of appeals upheld a decision by the
Minneapolis Commission on Civil Rights that police engaged in racial discrimination when they
detained an African American man based on an officer’s observation that the man was standing
on a grassy area near a lake frequently used by runners, dressed in jogging clothes, stretching
while talking on a cell phone, and across the street from another African American on a bike in
an area with a high incidence of thefts from vehicles. The court concluded that police did not
have specific and articulable facts to establish reasonable grounds to suspect Williams of
criminal activity and the length of time that Williams was detained (30 minutes in a squad car)
was unreasonable.100
In Minneapolis Police Department v. Kelly,101 the court of appeals affirmed a
Minneapolis Commission on Civil Rights awarding damages to an individual arrested by
Minneapolis police.102 In Kelly, a Minneapolis Park Police officer detained an African American
Minneapolis resident who was walking to a convenience store because the officer thought he
matched the description of a robbery suspect.103 Kelly did not understand why police stopped

98

Richardson, 239 N.W.2d at 202.
No. A09-1650, 2010 WL 2650495 (Minn. App. July 6, 2010).
100
Id. at *8.
101
776 N.W.2d 760 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
102
Id. at 763.
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Id.
99

VOLUME 5

2013-2014
Page 102

him and he resisted being handcuffed and placed in the squad car.104 Police brought Kelly to the
scene of the robbery and witnesses told them that he was not the robber. By this time, Kelly had
calmed down and he asked to be released. Instead of releasing him, police decided to charge him
with misdemeanor disorderly conduct and obstruction. Instead of issuing him citations for the
charges, they took him to jail where he was held for approximately five hours.105 The charges
were later dropped.106 The Commission concluded that jailing Kelly was a clear violation of
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires police to issue a citation for
misdemeanor offenses except in limited circumstances that were not present in this case. Thus,
police treatment of Kelly was so “at variance” with what would reasonably be expected under
the circumstances that racial discrimination was the probable explanation.107 The court held that
the Commission’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by substantial
evidence.108

104

Id. at 764.
Id.
106
Id.
107
Minneapolis Police Dep’t v. Kelly, 776 N.W.2d 760, 768 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). The court of
appeals explained the rule and its history, stating “[a] key component of the commission’s
determination is the Minnesota rule for when to detain and jail and when to issue a citation. That
rule holds that officers are to give citations for misdemeanor charges unless ‘it reasonably
appears to the officer that ... there is a substantial likelihood that the accused will fail to respond
to a citation.’ Minn. R.Crim. P. 6.01. This portion of the rule was adopted in 1975 when there
was a national effort to prevent the discriminatory use of arrests for minor offenses. See ABA
Standards of Criminal Justice §§ 10–2.2 cmt., 10–2.3 cmt. (2d ed. 1980) (‘A standard that
permits officers to arrest or not according to their personal assessment of a defendant inevitably
is bound to lead to unequal enforcement of the laws.’) (citing Kenneth Davis, Discretionary
Justice 80–96 (1971)). The rule and its comments recognize that arrest is justified if there is a
substantial likelihood that the defendant will fail to appear in court in response to a citation.
Minn. R.Crim. P. 6.01 cmt.” Id.
108
Id. at 769.
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This line of cases offers a useful roadmap for individuals claiming racial profiling against
police. Police practices such as full custodial arrest in lieu of issuing a citation, interrogating
vehicle passengers without any reasonable suspicion,109 stopping out of state vehicles for
excessive window tint,110 and questioning relating to immigration status111 could all potentially
serve as a basis for arguing that police conduct was so “at variance” with what is reasonably
expected under the circumstances that racial discrimination was the probable explanation.
Minnesota law does, however, have some loopholes that would allow police to engage in
racial profiling in a manner that would not be considered “at variance” with what is reasonably
expected under the circumstances.112 For example, police routinely run random license plate
checks on vehicles they encounter.113 The Minnesota Court of Appeals held in State v. Setinich
that computerized license plate checks do not constitute a search under the Fourth

109

See generally Fort, 660 N.W.2d at 415 (expanding the scope of a seizure to interrogate
passenger violated Fourth Amendment and Minnesota Constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures); Arpaio, No. PHX–CV–07–02513–GMS, 2013 WL
2297173, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2013) (noting that some officers routinely investigate vehicle
occupants without reasonable suspicion and noting the Sheriff’s office’s policy and practice to
use the race of occupants in determining if there is reasonable suspicion to investigate vehicle
occupants for immigration violations).
110
United States v. Billups, 442 F. Supp. 2d 697, 702 (D. Minn. 2006) (noting that windows
were tinted in excess of allowable levels in Minnesota but that the vehicle was not licensed in
Minnesota so it was not a basis for a stop of the vehicle).
111
Arpaio, No. PHX–CV–07–02513–GMS, 2013 WL 2297173, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2013).
But cf. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005) (no independent suspicion needed to question about
immigration status as long as it does not prolong the detention); United States v. Slater, 411 F.3d
1003 (8th Cir. 2005).
112
See supra notes 101–111 and accompanying text.
113
See, e.g., State v. Snegirev, No. C7-02-991, 2003 WL 21008598, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May
6, 2003) (describing St. Cloud police officer on patrol and running random license plate checks
of vehicles); State v. Parker, No. C9-02-247, 2002 WL 31891856, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 31,
2002) (describing officer patrolling Mall of America parking lots and ramps conducting random
license plate checks).
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Amendment.114 Further, it is common for police to initiate a traffic stop when the vehicle license
query indicates that the owner of the vehicle does not have a valid driver’s license. The owner’s
lack of a valid driver’s license has been upheld as valid grounds for a stop by the Minnesota
Supreme Court.115 In the days before random computerized checks, the Minnesota Supreme
Court upheld a stop based on the officer’s knowledge that one month prior, the owner had a
suspended license.116
Fifteen years later in State v. Pike, the Minnesota Supreme court noted that it is
reasonable for an officer to infer that the vehicle’s owner is the one driving the vehicle and
reiterated that knowing that the owner of the vehicle does not have a valid license is sufficient to
form reasonable suspicion for a stop.117 The court clarified that the assumption may be
unreasonable when the actual driver does not match the description of the owner.118 Thus, where
the owner is a young male and the driver is an older female, “any reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity evaporates.”119
D.

CONCLUSION

It is the ACLU’s opinion that because a valid vehicle stop will not, absent other evidence,
lead to liability for racial profiling, targeting Latino-looking drivers and making pretextual stops
based on minor traffic infractions (or the registered owner’s lack of a driver’s license) can be a
low-risk, high-reward proposition for police officers who feel compelled to engage in informal
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822 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).
State v. Duesterhoeft, 311 N.W.2d 866 (Minn. 1981).
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551 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Minn. 1996).
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immigration enforcement. Discriminatory policing may also occur when officers who have
unrecognized, internalized racial biases or anti-immigrant biases when they choose to focus their
efforts on identifying unlicensed drivers as opposed to observable traffic violations such as
speeding or careless driving.
While litigation can be a powerful tool when pursued with the right set of facts and
documentation, it can also be very difficult to obtain the statistical records and other evidence
needed to prove discriminatory treatment and discriminatory purpose. Litigation is even more
difficult when the victims of racial profiling are present in the U.S. without authorization. Even
though driving without a license is a misdemeanor requiring a citation rather than custodial
arrest, some officers may choose custodial arrest anyway. Once an individual is booked into jail,
their information, including country of birth, can be reviewed by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) who may ask the local jail to put a hold on the individual while they decide
whether or not they want to take custody of the person. Although ICE holds are voluntary, it is
common for local jails to honor them. The ICE hold often leads to removal proceedings. Even
where the person is the victim of blatant racial profiling, their most pressing concern is to fight
removal, not seek vindication for racial profiling. Even if they do seek vindication for the racial
profiling, the person may end up being deported long before litigation moves forward.
Transnational litigation is not impossible, but it is much more complicated and expensive.
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ANALYSIS OF STATE DRIVER’S LICENSE LAWS
Reducing restrictions on an immigrant’s ability to obtain a driver’s license or driving

permit has been a longtime goal of immigrant communities and advocates.120 While this remains
a highly politicized issue, recent legislation suggests that many states are currently working
toward expanding access to driver’s licenses rather than creating new restrictions.121 In 2013,
bills were introduced in 19 states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, that
would allow for driver’s licenses or permits for undocumented immigrants.122 Eight states, the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico enacted laws expanding immigrants’ access to licenses,
and another three states, including Minnesota, are likely to revisit similar legislation introduced
last session.123 This upswing in activity reverses a trend that began shortly after the events of
September 11, 2001.124
A.

REAL ID ACT

The enactment of the federal REAL ID Act125 in 2005 “prompted some states to impose
restrictions and document requirements that prevent[ed] certain [undocumented] immigrants
from obtaining licenses.”126 Passed as part of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act

120

Nat’l Immigration L. Ctr., Inclusive Policies Advance Dramatically in the States: Immigrants’
Access to Driver’s Licenses, Higher Education, Workers’ Rights, and Community Policing 1,
NILC.ORG (Oct. 2013), available at http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=963.
121
Id. at 1–2.
122
Id. at 1.
123
Id. at 3–4.
124
See Hansi Lo Wang, More States Let Unauthorized Immigrants Take The Wheel, NAT’L. PUB.
RADIO (Jun. 23, 2013, 7:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2013/06/23/194281121/more-states-let-unauthorizedimmigrants-take-the-wheel.
125
Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, §§ 101–502, 119 Stat. 302 (2005).
126
Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., supra note 120, at 2.
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for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, REAL ID provides, in pertinent
part, that “driver’s licenses cannot be accepted by federal agencies for any ‘official’ purpose
unless they meet the act’s documentation-related requirements,” including proof of U.S.
citizenship or valid immigration status.127 The sponsors of the Act were responding to findings
in the 9/11 Commission report that several of the 9/11 hijackers obtained state driver’s licenses
and used them to board the planes.128 Although REAL ID was initially set to go into effect by
2008, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has continually pushed backed its
enforcement schedule.129 A recent press release from DHS states that “[t]he Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) will continue to accept driver’s licenses and state-issued
identification cards from all jurisdictions until at least 2016.”130
Since the enactment of REAL ID, only 19 states have been found to be in full
compliance, with over half of the states, including Minnesota,131 passing laws or resolutions in
opposition.132 Real ID has been attacked on several grounds, with opponents claiming that it
places an undue burden on taxpayers, citizens, immigrants and state governments, as well as
creating a privacy risk that highly sensitive personal data will be compiled in a single, national
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Id.
Gregory A. Odegaard, A Yes Or No Answer: A Plea To End The Oversimplification Of The
Debate On Licensing Aliens, 24 J.L. & POL. 435, 470 (2008).
129
Press Release, DHS, DHS Releases Phased Enforcement Schedule for REAL ID (December
20, 2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/12/20/dhs-releases-phased-enforcementschedule-real-id.
130
Id.
131
See Press Release, ACLU, Minnesota Rejects REAL ID Act of 2005 (May 18, 2009),
available at https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/minnesota-rejects-real-id-act-2005
[hereinafter “Minnesota Rejects REAL ID Act”].
132
Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., supra note 120.
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database.133 Regardless of its effect, or lack thereof, REAL ID’s provisions still allow states to
also issue driver’s licenses that do not meet the minimum standards for official federal use,134
thus allowing states to issue driving privilege licenses or permits to immigrants for nonidentification purposes.
B.

STATES LAWS ALLOWING LICENSES REGARDLESS OF
IMMIGRATION STATUS

As of 2012, only three states, New Mexico, Washington and Utah, issued driver’s
licenses or permits to residents regardless of immigration status. First, New Mexico’s law went
into effect in 2003. 135 It allows an individual to obtain a driver’s license even if they do not have
a Social Security number, as long as they provide other required documentation, including proof
of identity and residency.136 Second, Washington’s law went into effect in 2004. 137 It allows an
individual to obtain a driver’s license even if they cannot show proof of legal presence, if they
can present proof of identity through acceptable documents.138 New Mexico, Washington, and
Utah are the only states to issue the same type of driver’s license to all drivers, regardless of
immigration status.139 The final state in this group, Utah, passed its law in 2005.140 Utah
provides for a one-year driving privilege card for those who do not present a Social Security
number, if they can show acceptable documentation to verify their identity and Utah
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See Minnesota Rejects REAL ID Act, supra note 131.
Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., supra note 120.
135
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-9 (West 2011).
136
Id.
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See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.035 (West 2008).
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Id.
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Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., supra note 120.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3-205 (West 2005).
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residence.141 This card is distinguished from other Utah driver’s licenses with the statement “for
driving privileges only—not valid for identification.”142
Eight additional states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico passed legislation in
2013 to allow immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses or permits regardless of their immigration
status. These include: California (effective January 1, 2015 or potentially earlier); 143 Colorado
(effective August 1, 2014);144 Connecticut (effective January 1, 2015);145 District of Columbia
(effective May 1, 2014);146 Illinois (effective November 28, 2013);147 Maryland (effective
January 1, 2014);148 Nevada (effective January 1, 2014);149 Oregon (effective January 1,
2014);150 Puerto Rico (effective August 7, 2014),151 and Vermont (effective January 1, 2014).152
While there are significant differences between the laws, including specific requirements,
restrictions, and time periods for validity, the key similarities are that each state sets forth

141

See id.
See id.
143
CAL. VEH. CODE § 12801.9 (West 2014).
144
COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-505 (West 2013).
145
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-36 (West 2013).
146
D.C. CODE § 50-1401.01 (West 2013).
147
CH. 6 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6.105.1 (West 2013).
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S.B. 715, 430th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013), available at
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2013RS/Chapters_noln/CH_309_sb0715t.pdf. MD. CODE ANN.,
TRANSP. § 16.122 (West 2014).
149
S.B. 303 (Nev. 2013), available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Bills/SB/SB303_EN.pdf.
150
S.B. 833 (Or. 2013), available at
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/LIZ/2013R1/Measures/Text/SB0833/Enrolled.
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P C0900 (P.R. 2013), available at http://www.oslpr.org/2013-2016/leyes/pdf/ley-97-07-Ago2013.pdf.
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S. 38, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2013), available at
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2014/Acts/ACT074.pdf.
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acceptable documentation to establish identity and state residence, and requires a distinguishing
feature on the document that separates it from other state-issued driver’s licenses.
C.

EFFORTS IN MINNESOTA

According to a 2010 report from the Pew Hispanic Center, Minnesota is estimated to
have a population of 95,000 undocumented immigrants.153 Prior to 2003, Minnesota residents
without lawful immigration status were not barred from obtaining a driver’s license. The change
in requirements occurred through an Administrative Rule change under the administration of
Governor Tim Pawlenty. Four months after 9/11, Pawlenty’s Commissioner of the Department
of Public Safety (DPS) initiated the rulemaking process to require driver’s license applicants to
provide proof of lawful presence.154 The rulemaking process was put on hold while the
Legislature considered anti-terrorism legislation.155 When the session ended without action on
driver’s license applications, DPS picked up the rulemaking process and adopted it through
emergency rulemaking procedures, claiming that the rules were necessary to address a serious
and immediate threat to public safety (i.e. terrorism) and that it would be contrary to the public
interest to allow the public review and comment that would be required under the ordinary
rulemaking process.156 The emergency rulemaking process was challenged by the ACLU of
Minnesota and a group of organizations and individuals who would be affected by the new rules
and who wished to have input into the rulemaking process.157 The Court of Appeals invalidated
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Report, Pew Hispanic Center, U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows Are Down Sharply Since
Mid-Decade, 14 (Sept. 1, 2010), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/126.pdf.
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Jewish Cmty. Action v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 657 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
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the emergency rules, finding that DPS failed to demonstrate how using the ordinary public
rulemaking process would be harmful to the public interest.158
In 2003, after the Court of Appeals decision, DPS again adopted the rules through the
ordinary rulemaking process. Among other things, the rules stated that “[t]he department shall
not issue a driver’s license, permit, or identification card if an individual has no lawful admission
status to the United States.”159 Since the Administrative Rule change did not apply to driver’s
license renewals, undocumented immigrants who received a license prior to 2003 are still able to
renew their licenses under the same procedures as other Minnesota drivers.
The public campaign for expanding the driver’s license privilege to all Minnesotans was
already in full force at the beginning of the 2013 session of the Minnesota Legislature.160 Bills
were introduced in the House and Senate on February 4, 2013 that would allow identification
issued by another country to be an acceptable proof of identity for Minnesota’s licensure
requirements.161 Advocates generally framed the issue in terms of public safety, while
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Id. at 611.
Sasha Aslanian, House Committee Approves Bill Allowing Driver’s Licenses for Illegal
Immigrants, MINN. PUBLIC RADIO NEWS (Mar. 13, 2013),
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2013/03/13/politics/bill-drivers-licenses-illegal-immigrants.
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Lisa Peterson-de la Cueva, Minnesota Immigrants Explain Why They Support Driver’s
Licenses for All, TWIN CITIES DAILY PLANET (Jan. 27, 2013),
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H.F. 348, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2013), available at
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2013), available at
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ear=2013&session_number=0&format=pdf.
159

VOLUME 5

2013-2014
Page 112

individuals in the Latino community shared personal stories of living in fear and the logistical
difficultly of living and working in Minnesota without a valid driver’s license.162
In March 2013, both the House and the Senate bills passed the necessary committees,
clearing the important policy committee deadlines.163 However, the Senate version was amended
to create a “driving privilege license” for Minnesota residents who are “unable to demonstrate
legal presence in this country through current lawful admission status, permanent resident status,
indefinite authorized presence status, or United States citizenship.”164 It also contained a
provision that “[a] driving privilege license must be plainly marked ‘FOR DRIVING
ONLY.’.”165
In mid-May 2013, with only days remaining in the Legislative session, immigrant
advocacy groups and individual Latinos began a hunger strike at the Capitol to raise awareness
and demand action on the pending bills.166 At that time, Governor Mark Dayton stated that he
was opposed to allowing undocumented immigrants to get driver’s licenses, but agreed to meet
with the bill’s supporters if the legislation passed in both houses of the Legislature.167 The
Senate bill finally received a floor vote on May 18, 2013, only three days before the scheduled
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end of the Legislative session, where it passed on a vote of 36-28. 168 The House of
Representatives failed to take further action before the end of the Legislative session on May 21,
2013.169
D.

ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO EXPANDING THE PRIVILEGE

Opponents of expanding the driver’s license privilege to undocumented immigrants often
argue that it rewards illegal behavior, raises national security concerns, and facilitates voting
fraud. Each of these arguments will be addressed in turn.
First, critics often argue that the state should not validate individuals who are present in
the United States in violation of immigration laws.170 Regardless of one’s moral view of
undocumented immigrants, these individuals live, work, and often have U.S. citizen family
members in our communities. As noted above, Minnesota is estimated to have a population of
roughly 95,000 undocumented immigrants.171 It would be both impractical and cost-prohibitive
to put all of these individuals into removal proceedings. Immigration law is a federal matter, and
a state’s role in issuing driver’s licenses to its residents should not be dictated by federal
immigration policy.
Second, opponents argue that allowing undocumented immigrants to obtain a state issued
driver’s license raises national security concerns.172 These concerns are typically linked to a fear
of terrorism and the fact that all but one of the nineteen terrorists responsible for the September
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11th attacks obtained some form of state issued identification.173 These concerns are easily
countered as myths by Professor Margaret Stock of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in
her leading article on driver’s licenses and national security.174 Professor Stock states that “[t]he
national debate about the connection between driver licenses and security has been characterized
by misinformation, and a lack of appreciation of the role that driver license and state
identification databases play in national security and law enforcement.”175 In fact, Professor
Stock argues that “[d]enying drivers licenses to illegal immigrants will hurt our national security
by depriving law enforcement officials of critical information on substantial numbers of adults
who are physically present in the United States.”176
Finally, some have raised concerns that issuing driver’s licenses to undocumented
immigrants will enable voting fraud by non-citizens. Even though some officials in other states,
such as Arizona, claim that undocumented immigrants commit voter fraud in large numbers,
reports have found that this simply is not the case.177 States that have recently investigated
whether non-citizens register to vote have found extremely low numbers of voter registration
fraud. A report from 2013 noted that “[i]n Colorado, election officials found 141 noncitizens on
the voter rolls, which was 0.004% of the state’s nearly 3.5 million voters. Florida officials found
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207, or 0.001% of the state’s 11.4 million registered voters.”178 These numbers are hardly
surprising given the fact that in order to register to vote, one must declare under penalty of
perjury that one is a U.S. citizen, which creates a strong disincentive for undocumented
immigrants to register to vote. Federal immigration law carries severe sanctions for anyone who
falsely claims to be a U.S. citizen or votes in an election. For example, a person who makes a
false claim to U.S. citizenship is deemed inadmissible.179 In addition, any person who votes in
violation of federal, state or local law is inadmissible to the United States.180 Even a lawfully
admitted immigrant who makes a false claim to citizenship is subject to removal from the United
States.181 Based on these extreme penalties, it is highly unlikely that an undocumented
immigrant that has availed himself or herself of the state to obtain a driving privilege license
would risk committing voter fraud.
E.

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF EXPANDING THE PRIVILEGE

As noted above, the primary argument in support of expanding the driver’s license
privilege to all residents regardless of immigration status is promoting public safety. In addition,
one may persuasively argue that the expansion would also increase the percentage of insured
drivers, allow for increased participation in society, and decrease instances of racial profiling of
Latino immigrants.
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Driving is a part of everyday life in this country, and licensing those who drive on a
state’s roads and highways is clearly a benefit to public safety.182 With expanded licensure,
undocumented immigrants would be required to take the same road tests and written exams
required to establish basic driving competence, as well as eyesight exams, before the state would
issue a driver’s license. Licensed undocumented immigrants would also have less fear of
interaction with law enforcement, potentially resulting in a lower rate of hit-and-run accidents.183
Studies have shown that a license increases the willingness of immigrant witnesses and victims
to cooperate with police and aid in investigations.184 Not surprisingly, many law enforcement
officials have supported efforts to expand the driver’s license privilege to all immigrants
regardless of immigration status.185
Another argument linked to public safety is that allowing licenses for undocumented
immigrants will decrease the percentage of drivers in the state who are uninsured. After enacting
their laws, Utah saw a nearly 80% drop in uninsured drivers, and New Mexico saw a nearly 60%
drop.186 The increase in insured drivers reduces insurance premiums for all drivers as the pool of
insured drivers expands.187 It also reduces the number of accidents involving uninsured
drivers.188
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Next, the ability to obtain a valid driving privilege license allows for increased
participation in society. In most parts of the country, one needs to drive in order to conduct all
types of daily business, including visits to health care providers, schools and shopping centers.
A study from 2005 showed that only 4.7% of Americans used public transportation to get to
work, compared with 87.7% who drove.189 It is increasingly hard to function in the United
States without being able to drive, and especially difficult in rural areas like those in Greater
Minnesota.
Finally, expanding the privilege could also decrease instances of the racial profiling of
Latino residents. As discussed above, racial profiling of immigrant communities often begins
with stops of vehicles based on the ground that the registered owner does not have a valid
driver’s license. Accordingly, by allowing undocumented immigrants to obtain a driving
privilege license, policy makers could remove one often-abused tool in the commission of racial
profiling.
V.

CONCLUSION
As the ACLU of Minnesota has seen through its experience in Greater Minnesota, racial

profiling is a serious problem, the causes of which are multifaceted. Consequently, there is no
one strategy that will identify and eliminate all forms of racial profiling by law enforcement. It
is important for policymakers to consider whether and to what extent various laws and policies
will alleviate or exacerbate racial biases in our criminal justice system. Making driver’s licenses
available to all qualified drivers regardless of their immigration status will not end racial
profiling, but it will help eliminate a tool that can be used by police to engage in the profiling of
Latino immigrants. While it is clear that state laws that restrict driver’s licenses will not fix the
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United States’ broken immigration system, laws that make driver’s licenses available regardless
of immigration status will improve public safety and help insulate immigrant communities, like
those in Greater Minnesota, from the devastating effects of racial profiling.

